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Abstract. Current management of disaster risks is often
fragmented due to a lack of coordination between involved
actors, i.e. civil protection and spatial planning – a phe-
nomenon which is known as the “problem of interplay”.
This paper presents an output-oriented risk management ap-
proach (“parametric governance”). Here, the modality of
the achievement of objectives remains in the hands of the
given addressees. This implies a shift from a top-down
to a more collaborative, process-oriented form of decision-
making. The approach has been successfully applied in two
hazard cases and three administrative contexts: (a) the City
of Dortmund (Germany) facing ﬂash ﬂoods, (b) East At-
tica region (Greece) facing forest ﬁres, and (c) Lazio Region
(Italy) also facing forest ﬁres. As proved by the applica-
tions of the concept, a dialogue among experts, stakehold-
ers, and decision-makers is indispensable in order to guaran-
tee inclusion of all diverse and competing values, opinions,
and claims. Moreover, a structured communication path is
needed to meet the requirements of a risk governance pro-
cess. Finally, a win-win-situation among the involved actors
has to be created to reach an agreement on common goals
and actions to achieve them in due time.
1 Introduction
The reduction of disaster risk from multiple hazard sources
is an explicitly pronounced aim in several international agen-
das, for example in the Agenda 21 (UN, 1992), the Johan-
nesburg Plan (adopted at the 2002 World Summit on Sus-
tainable Development) or the Hyogo Framework for Action
(UN-ISDR, 2005). Strategies and actions to “control, re-
duce and transfer risks” on the basis of risk assessments and
analyses can be subsumed under the term risk management
(UN-ISDR, 2009). Linking the relevant actors and policies
throughout the disaster management cycle, but also creating
an inventory of information on disasters are propagated as
key objectives by the EC Communication “A Community ap-
proach on the prevention of natural and man-made disasters”
(EC, 2009). Here, it becomes clear that available knowledge
on disasters is currently limited and suffers from a lack of
comparability.
Furthermore, current prevention of risk caused by nat-
ural hazards is fragmented, among others, between civil
protection and spatial planning (see e.g. Greiving et al.,
2006; Sapountzaki et al., 2011) and consequently fund-
ing is also fragmented. This is a problematic situation be-
cause the Response-Preparedness-Prevention-Remediation
(RPPR-) chain presupposes coordination between the in-
volved actors, or one co-ordinating actor. However,
the current, real situation is featured by processes where
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information, knowledge and activities run in parallel and
there are no linkages among sectoral planning, spatial plan-
ning and emergency response. The imperative of coordina-
tion refers not only to prevention/preparedness measures but
covers also preparations for the remediation phase because
the remediation stage functions simultaneously as the pre-
vention stage for the next disaster event (see Fig. 1). Ad-
ministrative fragmentation, however, complicates and/or pre-
vents co-ordination of activities. This is not an effective and
efﬁcient way to deal with risk, especially in times of/before
hazardous events because fragmentation and lack of coordi-
nation lead among others to lack of speciﬁc responsibility
and duplicated activities (Wanczura, 2010). These problems
imply huge, inefﬁcient, and ineffective resource consump-
tion, a key-issue in times of limited (ﬁnancial, personnel etc.)
resources. To avoid this and provide more ﬂexibility and bet-
ter coordination, the disaster risk community agrees on the
need of an integrated response strategy to disasters, covering
the whole RPPR-chain, in order to create resilient communi-
ties (see Sapountzaki et al., 2011).
To the above end, the European INCA Project (“Linking
civil protection and planning by agreement on objectives”) –
co-ﬁnanced by the Civil Protection Financial Instrument of
the European Community – was launched in 2009. It aimed
at bridging spatial, functional and operational gaps and diver-
gences in approach, competence, and perspective between
civil protection, spatial planning, and other administrations
in charge of prevention, by a collaborative process with con-
crete results to make measures and actions of risk prevention
and mitigation efﬁcient, effective, strategically aligned, and
sustainable (see also Sapountzaki et al., 2011). The authors
of this paper represent the project team of INCA and were
responsible for all three case studies which are presented in
Sect. 6.
The starting point for an alternative approach was the anal-
ysis of the state-of-art in three selected case study areas (East
Attica Region, Greece; Lazio Region, Italy; City of Dort-
mund, Germany). The situation of each case study was
analysed by means of literature research and expert inter-
views, considering all involved actors: civil protection, sec-
toral planning, and spatial planning. The analysis conﬁrmed
(a) the problem of lack of coordination between policies and
actors with joint competence for risk management and (b) a
minor or no role at all for spatial planning in risk manage-
ment (Sapountzaki et al., 2011). There was a mutual un-
derstating of these problems among all actors which has to
be seen as the crucial starting point for implementing a col-
laborative process, because the genuine interests of organ-
isations to gain more power often intervenes collaborative
processes. However, improving the inter-organisational co-
ordination through the intended agreement on common ob-
jectives was seen by all actors as a win-win-situation due to
the given shortcomings of the management practices regard-
ing their own agenda. The outcome was structured along a
SWOT-Analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and
Threats) for several elements of the RPPR-chain. This anal-
ysis served as an initial point for the concept of “Agreements
on Objectives” of risk prevention and damage mitigation that
integrates non-structural and structural risk mitigation activ-
ities, offering a practical, goal-oriented, consensual alterna-
tive to the more rigid and restrictive strategies of both plan-
ning and civil protection. The concept aims at more efﬁ-
ciency and ﬂexibility in risk prevention and response actions.
2 State-of-the-art in the ﬁeld of theoretical methods of
(risk) coordination, communication and governance
The concept of risk governance has been created and evolved
in the area of new, emerging, mostly man-made risks.
Nonetheless, it is of particular relevance also for natural
hazards. Actually the successful management of natural
hazards is limited, due to the fact that the interactions be-
tween individual sectors, disciplines, locations, levels of
decision-making, and cultures are not known or not consid-
ered (IRGC, 2005; Greiving et al., 2006). Inadequate pub-
lic available information about risks in terms of societal and
natural dimensions, inapprehensible procedural steps as well
as insufﬁcient involvement of the public in the risk-related
decision-making process lead to severe criticism and distrust.
Furthermore, decisions in the area of so called “tradi-
tional” hazards such as ﬂoods or mass movements, taken
mainly on the basis of engineering expertise, are normally
based on probabilities because they are mainly past-oriented
and informed by statistics. However, analysed data are only
available for a speciﬁc period and are thus not representa-
tive for longer periods. This problem is even enlarged by the
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observed climate change- related effects on temperature and
precipitation which will certainly lead to new uncertainties,
because past events might be not representative anymore.
Additionally, changes in the catchments (e.g. deforestation,
melting of glaciers, surface sealing through settlement de-
velopment, etc.) will lead to even higher uncertainties. For
new “uncertain” risks (see before), however, the perspective
changes in tendency from probability to possibility. These
are characterised by possible, new, imaginable hazards, un-
known coupling of processes, no or limited experience, com-
plex causalities, multiple, heterogeneous and long-term ef-
fects. Therefore, there is no scientiﬁc or historic proof but
they cannot be fully refuted either. The role of science in this
context is problematic because science cannot give a proof
of risk and cannot guarantee for safety. Science in this con-
text is inconclusive (van Asselt, 2005). With public decision-
makingnothavinganyprecisestatisticalinformationathand,
restrictions imposed on private property rights are probably
not legally justiﬁable anymore. Hereby, justiﬁcation of ac-
tions and consensus about thresholds for acceptable risks and
response actions becomes more important.
Within the global change debate, the ﬁeld of climate
change in general, but particularly as a triggering factor
for many natural hazards, is of special importance for Eu-
rope with its existing settlement structures, cultural land-
scapes and infrastructures which have been developed over
centuries. Land ownership, administrational and political
frameworks in Europe are very complex. Moreover, several
hazard-prone areas in Europe have only been settled recently.
However, prevention actions carried out i.e. by spatial plan-
ning are nonetheless less effective than in countries which
are still growing rapidly in terms of population and the built
environment. Here, disaster prone areas can be more eas-
ily kept free from further development whereas many more
of these areas in Europe are already built-up. This calls for
authorities to improve public risk awareness and to look for
means to mitigate this problem. Moreover, measures based
on mandatory decisions of public administration as well as
measures which are in the responsibility of private owners
need to be understood and regarded as suitable by their ad-
dressees so as to guarantee their implementation. This is
clearly visible when looking at evacuation orders or building
protection measures to be taken by private households. Hav-
ing these facts in mind, the “active involvement” of the pop-
ulation at risk is crucial for successful risk management and
its ultimate goal: the reduction of risks. This is propagated
for instance by the European Communities Flood Manage-
ment Directive (European Communities, 2007). Within the
European Community, it has been recognized as well that
this approach also has to be applied to other natural hazards
such as coastal hazards or soil erosion and landslide hazards
(e.g. European Commission, 2006).
Risk governance has become increasingly politicised and
contentious. The main reasons are controversies concern-
ing risk that are not about suitable scientiﬁc methodologies
for hazard and risk assessment (Armas ¸ and Avram, 2009).
Rather, risk controversies are disputes about who will deﬁne
risk in view of existing ambiguity. In many cases policy dis-
course is not about who is correct about assessment of dan-
ger, but whose assumptions about political, social, and eco-
nomic conditions as well as natural or technological forces
win in the risk assessment debate. Thus, the hazard as a po-
tentially damaging physical event is real, but risk is socially
constructed.
Scientiﬁc literacy and public education are important but
are not the only aspects necessary to avoid conﬂicts about
risk. Emotional response by stakeholders to issues of risk is
truly inﬂuenced by distrust in public risk assessment as well
as in risk management. Due to this fact, those who man-
age and communicate risks to the public need to understand
the emotional responses towards risk and the way risk is per-
ceived by the at-risk population. It is a matter of the deﬁni-
tion of risk how risk policy is carried out. Moreover, deﬁning
risk is an expression of power. Slovic (1999) thereby argues
that whoever controls the deﬁnition of risk, controls risk pol-
icy. Within the communication strategies in all approaches,
trust, transparency, clarity, and conﬁdentiality can be seen as
central terms in this respect (L¨ ofstedt, 2005; IRGC, 2009;
Greiving, 2009a).
Another deﬁcit in current risk management relates to the
lack of coordination between actors involved in the disas-
ter risk cycle as outlined by the EC Communication on “A
Community approach on the prevention of natural and man-
made disasters” (European Communities, 2009). According
to Meadowcroft (2002), it has to be pointed out that “there
are many inconsistencies in this formal hierarchy of scale.
[...] And territorially rooted institutions are constantly be-
ing stretched to engage with issues which escape their ju-
risdiction or inﬁltrate their frontiers.” Other authors high-
lighted that the effectiveness of the implementation of an
EU-directive depends in the ﬁrst instance on the ﬁtting of
the directives approach (here: the water basin approach) to
the existing institutional arrangements (Knill and Lenschow,
2000). In this context, research on the institutional dimen-
sions of environmental change has identiﬁed “cutting-edge”
themes. Young (2002) gives a closer description:
– Problem of ﬁt: the problem of ﬁt deals with congru-
ence or compatibility between ecosystems and institu-
tional arrangements created to manage human activities
affecting these systems. Overall, the presumption is that
the closer the ﬁt between ecosystems and institutional
systems, thebettertherelevantinstitutionswillperform;
– Problem of interplay: most institutions interact with
other similar arrangements both horizontally and ver-
tically. Horizontal interactions occur at the same level
of social organisation. Vertical interplay is a result of
cross-scale interactions or links, involving institutions
located at different levels of social organisation. Inter-
playbetweenoramonginstitutionsmaytaketheformof
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functional interdependencies or arise as a consequence
of politics of institutional design and management. The
problem of interplay is a consequence of the existence
of a multitude of actors.
Thus, any coordination of activities has to regard this frag-
mentation of responsibilities. These problems related to or-
ganisational capacities for responding to or monitoring risk
have been also pointed out as major deﬁcits of current risk
governance (IRGC, 2009).
3 Change of traditional government into
output-oriented governance: The “Agreement on
Objectives” approach and its implementation
During the last years, the understanding of the role of gov-
ernment has been changed from a traditional approach where
the state itself provides all kinds of public services to a model
which is characterised mainly by private services, while the
state only guarantees the quality of those services which are
of public interest (Johnson, 1991; Neary, 2001). One im-
portant reason can be seen in the lack of ﬁnancial resources
and the alteration of classical hierarchical government: the
addressees have control of important resources (e.g. infor-
mation, creativity, knowledge, etc.) not only in connection
to risk-related issues. Further, fewer and fewer standard-
ised solutions can be purported to manage the given situa-
tion, (e.g. of existing risk etc.). Therefore, the state switches
to bilateral-cooperative forms of governance, where the ad-
dressees concentrate on new, appropriate solutions and tar-
gets as well as output-oriented governance (summarised un-
der the term “Agreement on Objectives” or “parametric gov-
ernance”). This approach aims at governance via parame-
ters or requirements. Here, the modality of the achievement
of objectives remains in the hands of the given addressees
(Cools et al., 2003).
Risk governance can involve large and complex organi-
sations at different levels. Large organisations such as city
governments are complex, with a diversity of departments,
stakeholders, resources, constituents, and issues. They op-
erate in the context of ever-changing conditions and capa-
bilities that are difﬁcult to identify, so leveraging them into
practical, swift coordinated action is not an easy task when
mainly using traditional models that address political and ad-
ministrative systems, and reﬂecting all the coordination and
perception problems produced by those models. To ﬁnd an
appropriate model that supports the tasks connected to risk
governance is seen as an enormous challenge. There is a
need for a model based on an output-oriented process, i.e.
a model that can be simultaneously applied at continental,
national, and local levels. Therefore, the authors have elab-
orated a model that is based on a government process de-
signed to manage the risk problem as it arises in the territory
under consideration. This approach, differently from the tra-
ditional and conventional ones – where the risk management
process is adjusted to the legal-administrative system which
puts it into practice (input oriented model) – adapts the ad-
ministering structure to the risk features and problems. This
represents a very innovative perspective and opens wide hori-
zons regarding future modes of operation of public adminis-
trations, authorities, and stakeholders not only in the ﬁeld
of risk management but also in other policy ﬁelds, using the
approach of “Agreement on Objectives” described more in
detail in the following sections.
Such output-oriented management approaches have been
widely used for decades in new public management (Lane,
2000), but also comprehensive city marketing concepts (Pad-
dison, 1993). Up to now they are not common in disaster
risk management although there are several similarities such
as a need for coordination of actions of different autonomous
actors, common objectives and evaluating the effects of the
chosen measures. This justiﬁes an application test of an
output-oriented management approach to risk management
of natural hazards.
The process of the “Agreement on Objectives” is charac-
terised by three blocks: “Output”, “Impact”, and “Outcome”.
“Output” is the ﬁrst stage of the process described in Fig. 2.
Here, a given organisation supplies the necessary ﬁnancial
resources available to the addressees for the realisation of a
given objective. According to Krems (2007), “Impact” can
be seen as the reaction (i.e. contribution) of the addressees to
the output. In our case these are the actions that the funding
aims to achieve. “Outcome” is seen as the result of output,
(e.g. effects of the output concerning the political objectives)
or more generally speaking, it is the longterm situation aimed
at that is described through the project objectives (Haering et
al., 2002).
In connection to this, there are some instruments (sug-
gested by Haering et al., 2002) to control the whole process
of “Agreement on Objectives”:
– At the strategic level – which means the agreement on
an overarching goal principally possible at every spatial
level – the question arises of whether the agreed objec-
tives contribute to the desired outcome (reduction of the
given risk). Therefore “Monitoring” and “Evaluation”
are necessary instruments to control the obtained effects
as well as to evaluate the entire program (see Fig. 1).
These should be located at the appropriate (regional or
national) level.
– At the operational level, the performance of single mea-
sures contributing to the overarching goal, the system-
atic examination as well as the assurance of implemen-
tation of the agreed objectives are of major importance.
For this purpose “Controlling” can be used. It is a pro-
cess which covers both observation (retrospective) and
planning (prospective). It belongs to the responsibility
of the participants/addressees. They decide on the mit-
igation measures, and accordingly implement the given
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 12, 1085–1107, 2012 www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/12/1085/2012/S. Greiving et al.: Linking the actors and policies throughout the disaster management cycle 1089
 
 
 
S
t
e
p
 
8
:
 
 
C
o
n
t
i
n
u
o
u
s
 
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
v
i
e
w
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
g
r
e
s
s
 
out of this results the 
the group defines and establish 
are the basis for appropriate measures 
Step 1: 
Definition of the issue/problem and its geographical range 
Step 2: 
Creation of a workgroup 
Step 3: 
Agreements on objectives (incl. indicators for measurement) 
Step 4: 
Agreement on mitigation measures 
Step 5: 
Testing of feasibility/applicability of measures agreed upon and designation of implementation 
processes (i.e. key agencies and actors, timetables, leadership, intermediate and final products)  
Step 6: 
Agreement on indicators and measuring values for the contributions of the 
 participating partners concerning the achievements of objectives 
Step 7: 
Definition of appropriate stakeholders & information policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Agreement on objectives: Step-by-Step (Source: own elaboration) 
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objectives and detect the actual values on results. This
means that they control the effects (outcome) of the mit-
igation measures. Finally, the comparison of the tar-
geted and actual objectives has to be done in order to
know how far the objective has been achieved. In case
of large deviations the mitigation measure or the objec-
tive has to be reviewed and adapted, and the planning
cycle has to start again. In this context the dynamics of
the given risk as well as other circumstances such as the
available resources should be taken into account.
One of the central components of an “Agreement on Objec-
tives” is a kind of “product sheet” (see Table 1). This prod-
uct sheet can be seen as the central component or a treaty
(as a possible outcome of the “Agreement on Objectives”)
between the participating groups. It comprises the agreed
objectives and the contributions and/or achievements of the
contracting parties.
To sum it up, the “Agreement on Objectives” is charac-
terised by ﬂexibility and the possibility of a large variety of
solutions that lead to greater motivation and implementation
capacity of all involved actors (Cools et al., 2003). Further-
more, it offers elbow room to the addressees and has com-
parative advantages:
– the governance authority has a wide range of choices
with regard to the instruments that can be used for
the implementation of the objectives (opportunities for
sanctions, stimulations etc.);
– the targeted objectives are not too complex and can be-
come operational with the help of one or more parame-
ters;
– the overall objectives are split and the distinct com-
ponents are incorporated into the objectives of the ad-
dressees, orthecommunicationbetweenthegovernance
authority and the addressee is designed in a distinctive
way, that allows consensus on common objectives;
– the “Agreement on Objectives” can be applied (in prin-
ciple) at all levels of the planning system.
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Table 1. Product sheet of an “Agreement on Objectives” (Source: according to Haering et al., 2002).
Element Description
Objective Description of the intended outcome
Effect-oriented goal Description of the intended effects
Monitoring indicators Indicators for monitoring of the intended outcome
Product characteristics Description of basic information (legal framework, focused clientele etc.)
Treaty goals Contributions of the different partners to the intended outcome
Controlling indicators Indicators for controlling of the implementation and effects of the different
contributions (each treaty goal will be measured with a quantitative indicator)
Quality control Deﬁnition of quality goals such as best available technology or code of behaviour
Financing Cost unit for each of the treaty-goals
Incomparisontotraditional, input-orienteddecision-making,
the “Agreement on Objectives” offers more ﬂexibility. It is
an alternative process to the fragmented management of risks
and can be seen as a “win-win situation” for all included
partners, authorities, institutions, etc. especially under cir-
cumstances of rapid change and uncertainty (Fischhoff et al.,
1978; Wanczura et al., 2007; Wanczura, 2010). Under such
circumstances it is hardly possible to provide comprehensive
decision criteria. So, hierarchic and static rules as well as
frames are not sufﬁcient for dealing with rapidly changing
conditions and consensus becomes the only justiﬁable basis
for decisions. From this perspective, negotiations between
the different authorities can be seen as the only unfaltering
way to achieve “Agreement on Objectives”. Indeed nego-
tiations might render convergence of different interests and
values on common interest issues.
Considering it from the perspective of spatial planning in
particular, the “Agreement on Objectives” is even more im-
portant. This approach is a good solution for the chang-
ing role of (spatial) planning and the tasks spatial planning
is responsible for. The aim is agreement on objectives be-
tween spatially relevant actors (authorities) when dealing
with risks, for instance. It is obvious that existing spatial
plans are not very effective in achieving this aim because
policy priorities and measures are non-speciﬁc in terms of
potential contributions and concrete results. As such these
measures exert only minor or indirect pressure upon private
actors (Cools et al., 2003; Greiving, 2009b).
As a response to the lack of ﬁnancial resources and the
critics upon the old subsidy approach, the concept of “Agree-
ment on Objectives” offers an alternative. In this new ap-
proach, single, input-oriented projects (those which are sub-
sidised in the lack of consideration of subsidies’ effects and
outcome) are replaced by output-oriented agreements con-
nected with quantiﬁed effect- and output-requirements. The
old subsidy approach based on ﬁnancial support of techni-
cal risk protection measures paid only little attention to cost-
efﬁciency. Furthermore, the conventional approaches lacked
altogether a strategic and comprehensive perspective. In con-
trast to the past, the “Agreement on Objectives” focuses on
the output and from a comprehensive point of view, too. An
advantage of the concept is that the mode of achievement of
objectives remains in the hands of the given addressees. Fur-
thermore, since agreements concerning the output have been
made, the regional and local participants receive more scope
of action (Greiving, 2009b). These are important aspects be-
cause successful projects (also in the scope of risk manage-
ment) – according to Osborne and Gaebler (1992) – are those
which provide better quality and results for less money by
cutting down unnecessary regulations and creating opportu-
nities for creative solutions and cooperation.
Besides the agreement on one leading objective (or pack-
age of objectives), a further challenge is seen in the deﬁnition
of appropriate, relevant, andpracticable mitigationmeasures,
as well as indicators to measure the fulﬁlment of goals and
a potential treaty (as mentioned above). However, the indi-
cators and measuring values have to perform monitoring of
goals, implementation of measures and partners’ contribu-
tions in a reliable, precise and unerring way (Cools et al.,
2003).
4 Indicators as standing instruments of evaluation
The Guide Note on Indicators for Assessing Progress on Dis-
aster Risk Reduction (UN-ISDR, 2007) deﬁnes indicators as
“An explicit measure used to determine progress; a signal
that reveals progress towards objectives; a means of mea-
suring what actually happens against what has been planned
in terms of quality, quantity and timeliness.” (International
Development Research Centre quoted in UN-ISDR, 2007).
Thus indicators aim at the measurement of how far/well a
programme/concept is achieving its given objectives. They
deﬁne how performance is measured along a scale or dimen-
sion. In general it is possible to distinguish between qualita-
tive and quantitative indicators. Independent of the kind of
indicator, there are some requirements offered in the litera-
tureconcerninggeneralcharacteristicsofindicatorstoensure
they will be useful as well as effective (Audit Commission,
2000). There are numerous challenges, having crucial effects
on the realisation of an indicator system and the work with
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indicators. In the following the most important challenges
are discussed.
Selecting appropriate and useful indicators, “is a fairly
straightforward process, but requires careful thought, iter-
ative reﬁning, collaboration, and consensus-building” (US-
AID Centre for Development Information and Evaluation,
1996). Especially collaboration and consensus-building in
order to create commonly acceptable decisions is quite prob-
lematic in times where different aims and priorities exist and
risk management is often of secondary importance in rela-
tion to problems as e.g. unemployment, population loss, in-
frastructure shortages, etc. (Greiving et al., 2006). Conse-
quently, the selection of appropriate indicators could be very
problematic and could lead on the one hand to difﬁcult dis-
cussions and on the other hand to a failure of the system.
Another challenge is the formal selection of suitable indi-
cators. Shavelson et al. (1991) underlined that, “No indicator
system could accommodate all of the potentially important
indicators identiﬁed by such a comprehensive process and
still remain manageable. The second step, then, is to develop
a valid, useful, and parsimonious set of indicators. The pur-
poses the indicator system serves (e.g. description of trends,
information for accountability purposes) constitute one crite-
rion for reducing the initial pool of potential indicators. Sys-
tem designers need to consult potential users to determine
what those purposes should be, because the purposes will
dictate the type of information that must be collected and the
level to which it should be disaggregated.“
Additionally Shavelson et al. (1991) annotate that some
difﬁculties exist regarding the application of the characteris-
tic criteria mentioned above. The most important aspect is
that some highly desirable indicators, “may have to be elimi-
nated because they cannot be measured reliably.” That means
that not sufﬁciently developed indicators to be included into
an indicator system should be part of a developmental re-
search agenda. One example is the vulnerability of the en-
vironment which often cannot be measured at all. Once the
indicators meet the criteria of the responsible authority, they
can be incorporated into the given indicator system.
The next task is linked with requirements: “Many data
collection efforts and analyses will fall short of indicator re-
quirements. Some of the most important potential indicators
may not be measured at all and well-known difﬁculties with
existing datasets are likely to constrain the analyses that in-
dicators require. In many cases, sample sizes or designs will
not be adequate for disaggregating data by groups of interest;
some will not permit relational analyses among various com-
ponents of the system. It is important to identify the short-
comings in existing data and analyses, and where these gaps
and inconsistencies exist, to specify what work is needed to
obtain reliable, valid, and useful indicators.” (Shavelson et
al., 1991)
All these mentioned challenges were considered in the
elaboration process as well as the application of the indicator
system of the “Agreement on Objectives” concept.
5 Supporting instrument: “Road Map” for a guided
process
As mentioned in the introduction, the “Agreement on Ob-
jectives” concept is an approach bridging spatial, functional,
and operational gaps as well as divergences in approach,
competence, andperspectivebetweencivilprotection, spatial
planning, and other administrations in charge of prevention.
The collaborative process that has been built for this purpose
is based on the concept of “Agreement on Objectives” of risk
prevention and damage mitigation (see Sect. 3). The pro-
cess integrates non-structural and structural risk prevention
and mitigation activities, offering a practical, goal-oriented,
consensual alternative to the more rigid and restrictive spatial
plans.
The concept is envisaged to lead to more efﬁcient regional
governance and ﬂexibility in local risk prevention and re-
sponse actions. It is transferable to all spatial levels for all
hazard types and for all European countries. Its wide ap-
plication is expected to lead also to more structured and ef-
ﬁcient ways in coping with extreme events in transbound-
ary territories. The step-by-step application (“Road Map”)
of the Concept as presented in Fig. 3 is adaptable to every
speciﬁc place and particular risk problem. This is indeed
conﬁrmed by the three test cases (see Sect. 6). It should
be kept in mind that the elaboration of a successful concept
asks for an efﬁcient and goal-oriented analysis of the current
weaknesses and main deﬁcits in the practice of public ad-
ministrations in dealing with natural hazards in the selected
case studies. The procedure used here is partly reminiscent
of the process/methodology used within SWOT-Analysis,
where the responsible authorities (i.e. stakeholders) discuss
about the state-of-the-art of the given management of dealing
with risks. Speaking in general: SWOT-Analysis is a strate-
gic planning tool used for understanding and evaluation of
strengths (S), weaknesses (W), opportunities (O) and threats
(T) that are involved in an institution, project or whenever a
situation requires a decision (i.e. also valid for dealing with
risks).
According to Recklies (2005) the objective of the SWOT-
Analysis is to determine to what degree the actual strategy is
suitable and appropriate to meet the challenges and changes
in the environment of the organisation and/or institution (or:
dealing with a given risk). Concerning the topic discussed
above it is obvious that the current way of dealing with risk
is not satisfactory, so a change/adaptation of the strategy is
necessary.
The elements of SWOT-Analysis can be characterised in
four spheres as follows:
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River and its tributaries inside the city boundaries (right figure; own elaboration) 
The most meaningful event for the scope of the present paper has been a flash flood that occurred in 
July 2008. During only three hours the amount of precipitation reached the level of 200 mm. This 
was more than double the average precipitation of July. The reason for this was a stationary thunder 
cell. The losses of about 17.2 mio. € were caused due by an overstraining of the water-management-
infrastructures which failed to cope with the situation. This event highlighted the possibilities and 
especially the limitations of technical flood protection measures and of the management system at 
the local, regional and river catchment area level (Grünewald, 2009). Especially in the case of flash 
floods that is represented by the Dortmund example, emergency response tends to be the weak stage 
of the risk management cycle due to the rapidly developing hazardous event. In such hazard cases 
prevention and spatially differentiated preparedness measures have a special importance. These in 
turn necessitate risk-sensitive spatial analysis and planning. 
The discussion on the problem described before (Step 1) led to the definition of the basic overall 
objective, i.e. Mitigation of risk in case of flash floods in Dortmund. This was the starting point for 
the establishment of a main working group that tried to deal with the challenge. In order to become 
operational this objective was further split into four sub-objectives (see fig. 4): 
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– Strengths: attributes of the process which are helpful to
achieving the given objective;
– Weaknesses: attributes of the process which are harm-
ful to achieving the objective;
– Opportunities: external conditions which are helpful
to achieving the objective (potential favourable condi-
tions);
– Threats: external conditions which could do damage
to the performance (potential unfavourable conditions)
(for more information see Blake et al., 2005).
These key-aspects of SWOT-Analysis were taken into ac-
count during the elaboration and work with the Road Map
that will be presented in the following sub-chapters.
Step 1: Deﬁnition of the issue/problem and its geographi-
cal range
Before starting with resolving the problem of a given risk,
it is important and necessary to frame the problem. What
should be achieved (especially in the long-term)? What
would be an optimal way of dealing with this risk? What
is the geographical range of the risk, (i.e. is it a local or a
regional problem)? Deﬁning the overall vision, mission, pri-
orities, and goals with regard to the speciﬁc risk is the focus
of this ﬁrst step and the prerequisite to ﬁnd/deﬁne appropri-
ate strategies to solve the problem. This ﬁrst step is up to
those actors who initiative the process. IT could either be a
representative of a planning or civil protection authority.
Step 2: Creation of a workgroup
Once the 1st step is clariﬁed, the 2nd step concentrates
on setting up a working group focussing on the described
issue/problem. This working group should normally be es-
tablished by an administrator who is in charge of managing
a certain risk, either due to internally identiﬁed weaknesses
of a given management system or stimulated from outside
the organisation (e.g. by pressure of stakeholders). In any
case, such a working group should combine all the available
administrative competence and expertise with regard to the
addressed risk.
This working group aims ﬁrst of all at deﬁning a procedu-
ral path that is in line with the characteristics of the addressed
risk and the given legal and socio-cultural background. Here,
some key-questions are:
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– What is the aim of the group/project? The problem-
framing should be clear.
– Whoarethepeople/institutionswhoshouldbeinvitedto
participate in the working group? This depends on the
topic: sometimes various experts in different ﬁelds are
necessary. However, the people in charge of the speciﬁc
risk issues have to be involved;
– How many people should be invited to participate in the
working group? Too many participants may cause end-
less discussions that could delay or even elude a result.
These questions drive the overall process and determine the
actions to follow. It is also possible to create several sub-
groups, which is recommended primarily in case of a com-
plex risk setting and/or involvement of people with very dif-
ferent professional backgrounds. In this case, special atten-
tion should be paid to the coordination of the subgroups.
The process will certainly be more efﬁcient and lead to
more satisfying results if the public and/or private bodies that
are legally responsible for decision-making are represented
right from the beginning. A person or a small team should
be appointed who will be in charge of the procedural aspects.
Furthermore, an external facilitator should be considered to
offer support and join the process. Such support contributes
to money saving and efﬁciency (e.g. it ameliorates problems
owing to different hierarchical levels or different understand-
ing of certain topics) and offers professional help in dealing
with emotional responses to risk.
Step 3: Agreement on Objectives (including indicators for
measurement)
In the 3rd step, the working group has to agree on goals as
a basis for the elaboration of risk mitigation measures. Here,
one should take care that only realistic and attainable goals
are selected. Otherwise the whole process can be doomed.
The goals have to be deﬁned as clearly and simply as possi-
ble. Only the appropriate selection of goals will lead to an
appropriate and promising process!
Sub-Step 3.1 Deﬁnition of appropriate indicators
In connection to the deﬁned goals/objectives, appropriate
indicators should be selected also to measure the given ob-
jective (the guiding question for selecting indicators could
be: how can the objective/goal be measured?). These will
provide a structure for commonly agreed solutions to the
given problem, allowing steady improvement and continuous
monitoring. However, indicators alone cannot meet the de-
mands of a risk-reduction objective; appropriate measuring
values are needed.
Sub-Step 3.2 Deﬁnition of appropriate measuring values
A prerequisite for an assessment is the existence of clearly
deﬁned (qualitative and quantitative) measuring values for
each of the deﬁned indicators. The measuring values shall
ideally be identiﬁed by the working group. They show
the current performance of a certain indicator. Here, the
guiding-question for every chosen indicator is: how can the
indicator be measured?
Sub-Step 3.3 Classiﬁcation of measuring values
Once the measuring values are elaborated, appropriate lev-
els for their classiﬁcation have to be chosen. The number
of classes may vary between the indicators. There might be
indicators that need only three classes to describe their per-
formance, others might need ﬁve. The following example
indicates a case of ﬁve classes. This classiﬁcation allows the
assessment of the performance of a given process (Website
Balanced Scorecard):
– Red=initial (with no formal process);
– Orange=managed (processes are planned and con-
trolled);
– Yellow=deﬁned (processes described in standards,
tools and methods);
– Green=quantitatively managed (sub-processes are
controlled using data analysis);
– Blue=optimizing (data are used to continuously im-
prove processes).
Step 4: Agreement on mitigation measures
In order to accomplish the given (theoretical) objective
ﬁxed in the 3rd step, it is necessary to deﬁne appropriate
and feasible mitigation measures. This should be done by
the whole group to guarantee the acceptance of the mitiga-
tion measures. It is obvious that every objective agreed on
and deﬁned in the process (see 3rd step) should be realised
by corresponding mitigation measures. In this context some
aspects should be taken into account:
– Who will be the responsible authority/authorities for the
realization of the mitigation measure(s)?
– What is the most appropriate mitigation measure(s) to
meet the objective?
– Where is/are the mitigation measure(s) to be located?
(with a geographical localisation on a map)
– What are the approximate costs for the realisation of the
mitigation measure(s)?
– What is the appropriate time and time horizon for the
realisation of the mitigation measure(s)?
– How efﬁcient is/are the mitigation measure(s)?
The indicators identiﬁed in the 3rd step should be used as
measuring instruments. It is possible to assess and compare
several mitigation measures by using these indicators and
selecting the most appropriate ones according to their efﬁ-
ciency in meeting the overall objective. Table 2 shows an
example from Italy for the case of forest ﬁres.
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Table 2. Example of the context of objective, measures and indicators according to the Italian case study (Source: own elaboration).
Example of an
agreed objective
Possible mitigation measures Indicator
Reduction of forest ﬁre
risk in the Lazio Region
Interaction between
Civil Protection and
Urban and Spatial
Planning
Identiﬁcation of vulnerable
areas by integrating data from
Civil Protection and Urban
Plans (Alternative 1)
Number of newly identiﬁed
vulnerable areas
Increase awareness among pro-
fessional associations (e.g. of
architects, urban planners and
engineers) by means of a ques-
tionnaire (Alternative 2)
Number of ﬁlled in
questionnaires
Thechosenindicatorsandrelevantclassiﬁcationsfacilitate
the assessment of the state-of-art as regards coping capacities
in dealing with risk (see explanations in Sub-step 3.3). The
results can be shown on a scorecard. A scorecard is a tool
which shows if activities on a speciﬁc issue are in line with
overall objectives.
Step 5: Testing of feasibility/applicability of measures
agreed upon and designation of implementation processes
(i.e. key agencies and actors, timetables, leadership, inter-
mediate and ﬁnal products)
This step refers to the move from decisions to real action.
The procedure includes selection of key agencies or actors
to implement measures, assignment of tasks to actors, ad-
dressing the obstacles to implementation arising from public
administration inertia, resistance on the part of Civil Soci-
ety, etc. This is a very crucial step because the results of the
measure depend largely on the selection of the agencies and
persons in charge, on the selection of a well-ﬁt implemen-
tation process, on addressing barriers, and so on. It presup-
poses agencies and individual persons taking initiatives and
pilot actions and having leadership qualiﬁcations, especially
if the application of measures necessitates the activation of
voluntary groups. It also presupposes a resilient philosophy
of implementing measures by minimizing extra needed re-
sources, taking advantage of opportunities, etc.
Step 6: Agreement on indicators and measuring values
forthecontributionsoftheparticipatingpartnersconcerning
the achievements of objectives
In the 6th step the participating partners contribute to the
elaboration and selection of appropriate indicators and mea-
suring values for the mitigation measures which are per-
formed by each actor. The guiding questions in this context
are:
– How can the contribution of involved partners be mea-
sured?
– How can the effectiveness of the involved partners con-
cerning the implementation of objectives be measured?
(Effectiveness of contribution of partners involved).
The results of the “Agreement on Objectives” can be mea-
sured by means of effectiveness and efﬁciency indicators.
The effectiveness indicators measure the extent to which a
goal has been reached for a given ﬁeld of action or mitigation
measure. This allows a comparison between the planned and
actually achieved outcome. Such indicators are the effect of
a complex cause-and-effect chain that combines output with
impacts and outcomes. On the contrary, the efﬁciency indi-
cators give information about the planned and real develop-
ment of a given output, because efﬁciency is derived from
the comparison between the input and output of a mitigation
measure. Here, the comparison between required values and
the measured, achieved values can be carried out in several
output-dimensions:
– quantitative;
– qualitative;
– cost objectives (cost recovery);
– satisfactory objectives (target-group oriented).
A real impact-control is not possible but also not neces-
sary, because there are several driving factors which inﬂu-
ence the status of a system, such as demography or economic
change. A shrinking in GDP might lower the given damage
potentially much more than a certain agreed measure (e.g.
retroﬁtting of existing building structures). In case of mon-
etarily quantiﬁable risks, the output could be expressed in
terms of the evolution of annualized average losses compared
with a ﬁxed goal (success-control).
Step 7: Determination of appropriate stakeholders (target
group) and information policy
The 7th step can be regarded as a basic step concerning not
onlytrust-buildingbutalsoacceptanceofthemitigationmea-
sures in a given area. From the early beginning, appropriate
stakeholders should be included in the whole concept-cycle.
The responsible authorities should be aware that inadequate
information about risks, inapprehensible procedural steps, as
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well as insufﬁcient involvement of the public in the decision-
making process lead to severe criticism and mistrust which
undermines respect of relevant decisions (e.g. a given miti-
gation measure). Trust has a key role in dealing with risks:
only those who are well informed and integrated in the pro-
cess will accept the decisions made by the authorities.
The “Agreement on Objectives” or a treaty (as a possible
result of the “Agreement on Objectives”) necessitates also
the involvement of corresponding (and indirectly concerned)
stakeholders. Appropriate procedures of participation and
information paths should be selected.The degree of involve-
ment should be chosen in accordance with the level of the
risk governance process (not every stage of the risk gover-
nance demands intensive involvement of stakeholders). The
following guiding questions concerning the stakeholders can
be used to measure the progress and level of the participation
process:
– To what extent are stakeholders identiﬁed (through a
proper process – incl. prioritisation)?
– To what extent are all relevant social groups and their
expectations known?
– To what extent are all relevant social groups moti-
vated/involved?
– To what extent is information accessible?
– To what extent are the stakeholders interested in having
information, and in the outcome?
– To what extent do the stakeholders trust the decision
makers, institutions and information available?
– To what extent do the stakeholders accept the process
and the outcome?
– To what extent is the dialogue constructive (one that
guarantees listening and mutual understanding)?
Step 8: Continuous monitoring/review of risk governance
process and continuous consultation
It should be clearly stated that the objectives, selected indi-
cators, measuring values, as well as indicator classiﬁcations
are subject to a dynamic process and are neither static nor
unchangeable. They have to be adapted periodically to the
expectations and requirements of the responsible body or in-
stitution, as well as to the existing and possibly changing cir-
cumstances. Additionally, the changing activities of institu-
tions and the progress of review cycles inﬂuence the mea-
surement values and classiﬁcations. Therefore Step 8 runs in
parallel to all other steps as indicated in Fig. 2 above.
6 Bringing theory into practical implementation
The following sub-chapters present a short description of the
case studies elaborated during the INCA project, i.e. City
of Dortmund (Germany), East Attica region (Greece), and
Lazio Region (Italy). The sections highlight the implemen-
tation process of the agreement on objectives in these three
territories with respect to the respective exposures to ﬂash
ﬂoods and forest ﬁres. The agreed and applied mitigation
measures are also included.
6.1 The case of the city of Dortmund facing ﬂash ﬂoods
The city of Dortmund is located in the Ruhr-Area (as part
of the Federal State North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany) (see
Fig. 3). Its population of 583945 inhabitants (census 2007)
and an area of about 280km2 (with a population density of
1260 inhabitants per km2) make Dortmund the largest city in
the region (Stadt Dortmund, 2007). The area of Dortmund
is traversed by the Emscher River from the east to the north-
west (see Fig. 3). About 40% of the catchment area consists
of poldered1 surfaces. In Dortmund, large parts of the city’s
territorysubsidedupto20masaresultofformercoalmining
activities. Nowadays, these areas are equipped with artiﬁcial
drainage facilities. The main watercourse of the Emscher
River is largely surrounded by dikes, especially in areas with
subsidence caused by mining.
The most meaningful event for the scope of the present
paper has been a ﬂash ﬂood that occurred in July 2008. Dur-
ing only three hours the amount of precipitation reached
the level of 200mm. This was more than double the av-
erage precipitation of July. The reason for this was a sta-
tionary thunder cell. The losses of about 17.2 mio. C were
caused due by an overstraining of the water-management-
infrastructures which failed to cope with the situation. This
event highlighted the possibilities and especially the limita-
tions of technical ﬂood protection measures and of the man-
agement system at the local, regional, and river catchment
area level (Gr¨ unewald, 2009). Especially in the case of ﬂash
ﬂoods that is represented by the Dortmund example, emer-
gency response tends to be the weak stage of the risk man-
agementcycleduetotherapidlydevelopinghazardousevent.
In such hazard cases, prevention and spatially-differentiated
preparedness measures have a special importance. These in
turn necessitate risk-sensitive spatial analysis and planning.
The discussion on the problem described before (Step 1)
led to the deﬁnition of the basic overall objective, i.e. Miti-
gation of risk in case of ﬂash ﬂoods in Dortmund. This was
the starting point for the establishment of a main working
group that tried to deal with the challenge. In order to be-
come operational, this objective was further split into four
sub-objectives (see Fig. 4).
The selection of sub-objectives was based on the experi-
ence of the participants of the working group (Step 2). The
1 A polder is a low-lying tract of land enclosed by embank-
ments known as dikes and forming an artiﬁcial hydrological entity,
meaning it has no connection with outside water other than through
manually-operated devices.
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Figure 4: Hierarchy of objectives (Source: own elaboration) 
The selection of sub-objectives was based on the experiences of the participants of the working 
group (Step 2). The intention was to strengthen the mitigation pillar of the disaster cycle (especially 
evident in the first three sub-objectives), but also to improve the reaction time of the civil protection 
authorities.  
Besides the issue of appropriateness of the stakeholders in relation to flash floods other risk 
management questions were: who should be involved in the work, who should cooperate with whom 
and who could take decisions within the scope of own responsibility. The main working group 
consisted of the following institutions/stakeholders: 
•  City office of Heavy Engineering, Sewage Division; 
•  Environmental Agency, Lower Water Authority; 
•  Urban Department of Planning and Building; 
•  Emschergenossenschaft (association for water management); 
•  Fire Department; Crisis Management Group; 
•  DEW (Dortmund Energy and Water); and 
•  TU Dortmund University (as mediator). 
The work of this group was aimed at communicating the strategies that were elaborated in each of 
the participating institutions. It has been obvious right from the beginning that decision-making and 
work should be structured into more detailed sub-objectives, so as to become operational (see 
before). Therefore the working group decided to split into four sub-groups in line with the four sub-
objectives mentioned above. As individual institutions did not have expertise and were not interested 
in the whole range of sub-fields involved, splitting objectives and working groups was considered as 
an efficient action to take in the implementation process. 
The focus of attention of each working group was established after discussion of the different aspects 
and points of view (identification of weaknesses and threats concerning the actual dealing with 
risks). As a consequence, the achieved results reflect a synthesis of the different perspectives which 
is also reflected in the indicators and measuring values. 
The sub-group on new developments, for instance, agreed on a flood-proof of future legally binding 
land use plans. This concerns several aspects:  
•  Water bodies (e.g. is the legally binding land use plan located in a flooding area?)  
•  Sewer system (e.g. how will the rain water be discharged?)  
•  Emergency water path (e. g. how to direct flood water what exceeds the capacity of the 
sewage system?)  
Fig. 4. Hierarchy of objectives (Source: own elaboration).
intention was to strengthen the mitigation pillar of the disas-
ter cycle (especially evident in the ﬁrst three sub-objectives),
but also to improve the reaction time of the civil protection
authorities.
Besides the issue of appropriateness of the stakeholders
in relation to ﬂash ﬂoods, other risk management questions
were: who should be involved in the work, who should co-
operate with whom, and who could take decisions within the
scope of own responsibility. The main working group con-
sisted of the following institutions/stakeholders:
– City ofﬁce of Heavy Engineering, Sewage Division;
– Environmental Agency, Lower Water Authority;
– Urban Department of Planning and Building;
– Emschergenossenschaft (association for water manage-
ment);
– Fire Department; Crisis Management Group;
– DEW (Dortmund Energy and Water); and
– TU Dortmund University (as mediator).
The work of this group was aimed at communicating the
strategies that were elaborated in each of the participating
institutions. It was obvious right from the beginning that
decision-making and work should be structured into more
detailed sub-objectives, so as to become operational (see be-
fore). Therefore, the working group decided to split into four
sub-groups in line with the four sub-objectives mentioned
above. As individual institutions did not have expertise and
were not interested in the whole range of sub-ﬁelds involved,
splitting objectives and working groups was considered as an
efﬁcient action to take in the implementation process.
The focus of attention of each working group was estab-
lished after discussion of the different aspects and points of
view (identiﬁcation ofweaknesses and threats concerning the
actual dealing with risks). As a consequence, the achieved
results reﬂect a synthesis of the different perspectives which
is also reﬂected in the indicators and measuring values.
The sub-group on new developments, for instance, agreed
on a ﬂood-proof of future, legally-binding land-use plans.
This concerns several aspects:
– water bodies (e.g. is the legally-binding land-use plan
located in a ﬂooding area?);
– sewer system, (e.g. how will the rain water be dis-
charged?);
– emergency water path, (e.g. how to direct ﬂood water
what exceeds the capacity of the sewage system?);
– streets and roads, (e.g. what “design” characterises the
streets/roads)
– buildings and infrastucture, (e.g. is critical infrastruc-
ture envisaged in the legally-binding land-use plans?);
– communication, (e.g. are all appropriate stakeholders
included?).
As most of the areas in Dortmund are already built and
developed, the actions of the working group dealing with
new development were limited. Nevertheless, the sub-group
agreed that it is necessary that future, legally- binding land-
use plans should be considered in terms of ﬂooding (Step 4).
This consideration refers to several aspects and related indi-
cators:
– water bodies, (indicator: number of legally-binding
land-use plans located in a ﬂooding area?);
– sewer system, (for instance: how should rain water be
discharged?);
– streets and roads, (indicator: what are the “design” stan-
dards of the streets/roads?);
– buildings and infrastructure, (indicator: is critical in-
frastructure envisaged in the legally-binding land-use
plans?);
– communication, (indicator: extent of inclusion of ap-
propriate stakeholders)
The key aspect and important for all four working groups
was the identiﬁcation of critical infrastructure located in the
Dortmund area (related indicator: percentage of analysed ter-
ritory of City of Dortmund). The term “critical infrastruc-
ture” describes organisations and facilities of strategic im-
portance for the community, (i.e. telecommunications, power
supply systems, banking/ﬁnance, transportation, water sup-
ply, emergencyservices). Theirfailuremayleadtolong-term
supply bottlenecks, signiﬁcant disruptions concerning public
safety or other dramatic consequences (BMI, 2009).
As shown by Fig. 5 below, the identiﬁcation of critical in-
frastructure was successfully done (Step 5). Mainly the his-
toric city district centres such as Marten are at risk where
no legally-binding land-use plans are in place which regulate
land use and foster ﬂood risk mitigation by designating wa-
ter retention ponds and decentralised rainwater inﬁltration.
Thus, an improved, regulative, land-use planning framework
is required which aims at mitigating the given ﬂood risk.
Thereby, further building permissions should only be granted
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if there is sufﬁcient discharge capacity. In addition, individ-
ual building protection could be required by concrete textual
designations of legally binding, land-use plans. Moreover,
this map served as evidence basis for the intended retroﬁtting
of the power transformer stations which are at ﬂood risk (op-
erated by the local energy supplier DEW 21).
Furthermore, checklists with building precautions versus
ﬂoods were elaborated. This was envisaged as a mean of
raising the awareness of, e.g. the architects who inﬂuence
building construction and design and the adoption of ﬂood
resistance standards.
As an additional measure, it was decided that inspections
for the purpose of ﬁre protection (obligatory in Germany)
should include compliance with ﬂood protection standards,
too. The related indicator is: percentage of inspections in
which the issues of ﬂood protection are covered. The appro-
priateclassiﬁcationisdoneinthreestepsasshowninTable3.
It was acknowledged that the responsibility of the build-
ing owner should not be neglected (self-precaution). Raising
risk perception of building owners was considered achiev-
able only in the long-term through such means as informa-
tion campaigns, ﬂyers, communication, etc.
The work within the group managing the aspect “improve-
ment of existing response capacity” was seen as an important
point because current response capacity was not considered
satisfactory. Up to now, only basic equipment has been avail-
able and there is a need of special equipment to facilitate the
action of the ﬁre brigade and rescue services (e.g. power-
ful large pumps and transport to reach ﬂooded areas). An-
other addressed problem concerned the call centre of the ﬁre
brigade. Waiting-time in case of emergency calls is too long,
thus emergency calls get “lost” (the callers hang up). The
problem of long waiting times before a rescue team arrives is
also a challenge (the capacities are limited. Indicator: wait-
ing time in minutes).
As most of the problems described are connected to the
lack of ﬁnancial resources, their resolution is not easy, at
least in the short and medium terms. The working groups
concentrated of course on those problems that could be re-
solved under given conditions of resource availability (ﬁnan-
cial, staff etc.). The mitigation measures proposed by the
different sub-groups were an integrated part of the whole
concept (see Step 6, i.e.). An agreement on indicators and
measuring values for the contributions of the different partic-
ipating partners (concerning the achievements of objectives)
was a core element of the collaborative process. The related
tasks, responsibilities, mitigation measures, and indicators
were updated during the work within the case study accord-
ing to new information (Step 8). Beside Step 8, also Step 7
was seen as an important aspect, as the results of the working
groups were communicated in regular intervals.
6.2 The case of the East Attica Region facing forest ﬁres
The Greek case study area occupies the eastern part of the
Region of Attica where the agglomeration of Athens is lo-
cated. The sub-region of concern was the area that falls un-
der the jurisdiction of the Directorate of Forests of East At-
tica, the superior authority which exerts forest policy guid-
ance and control over the Forest Service Ofﬁces (FSOs) of
Kapandriti, Parnitha, Penteli, and Lavrio (see Fig. 6). The
Directorate of Forests of East Attica lies within the wider
structure of the administrative organization of the Attica Re-
gion.
The speciﬁc area of East Attica was selected as a case
study because it represents an instructive example of mis-
management of forest ﬁre risk potential in Greece. The se-
lected sub-region is an area of 1930km2, which approxi-
mates but does not coincide with the former Prefecture of
East Attica2 which in 2001 amounted to 403918 inhabitants
(National Census of 2001).
According to Sapountzaki et al. (2011), East Attica re-
ceives the urban sprawl of the Athens agglomeration and is
dotted with satellite settlements (especially along the east-
ern coastline) which are continuously growing. They are
2 Prefectures have been abolished altogether as a result of the
2010 national reform of the local and regional governance system,
known as the “Kallikratis” plan
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in the wider Region of Attica are registered as events of unknown causes. The respective percentage 
has increased from 41.7% by 1990 to 66.8% in the period 1991-2004 (Kaoukis, 2009). Official 
ignorance of the actual root causes of the catastrophic phenomenon is a precursor of an ineffective 
risk management system. 
It is reliably suspected however that the phenomenon is connected with the high demand for building 
development land and gradual transformation of East Attica into a mixed wild-land / urban / holiday-
making area. This is supported by the factual observation that the “winners” of forest fires (in the 
long term and after successive catastrophic events) are predominantly (a) building development and 
(b) mixed patterns of land cover where forests or cultivations are intermingled with building clusters 
and technical infrastructure. Despite the above widespread empirical indications of the importance of 
spatial planning, it is clear that it remains totally absent from the forest fire risk management system 
(Sapountzaki et al., 2011). 
Horizontal interactions between the three Directorates are almost non-existent. After the stimulus 
generated by the INCA project a core Working Group has been established in the Region of Attica to 
serve the “Reduction of Forest Fire Risk” as an umbrella-objective. This consisted of members of the 
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dominated by second homes or semi-permanent residential
developments. Also, East Attica hosts the new interna-
tional airport “Eleftherios Venizelos” which attracts specu-
lative land uses and entrepreneurial activities yielding high
land revenues and raising land values in the vicinity.
Above authors emphasize that due to ineffective ﬁre in-
vestigation procedures, most of the ﬁre events in the wider
Region of Attica are registered as events of unknown causes.
The respective percentage has increased from 41.7% by
1990 to 66.8% in the period 1991–2004 (Kaoukis, 2009).
Ofﬁcial ignorance of the actual root causes of the catas-
trophicphenomenonisaprecursorofanineffectiveriskman-
agement system.
It is reliably suspected, however, that the phenomenon
is connected with the high demand for building develop-
ment land and the gradual transformation of East Attica
into a mixed wild-land/urban/holiday-making area. This is
supported by the factual observation that the “winners” of
forest ﬁres (in the long term and after successive catastrophic
events) are predominantly (a) building development and (b)
mixed patterns of land cover where forests or cultivations are
intermingled with building clusters and technical infrastruc-
ture. Despite the above, widespread, empirical indications of
the importance of spatial planning, it is clear that it remains
totally absent from the forest ﬁre risk management system
(Sapountzaki et al., 2011).
Horizontal interactions between the three Directorates are
almost non-existent. After the stimulus generated by the
INCA project, a core Working Group has been established
in the Region of Attica to serve the “Reduction of Forest Fire
Risk” as an umbrella-objective. This consisted of members
of the Region of Attica (REGAT), all three Directorates, the
Harokopio University of Athens (HUA), and the National
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(Greek) Agricultural Research Foundation (NAGREF). In
particular its members have been as follows:
– the head of the Directorate of Forests of East Attica
(REGAT);
– the head and representative of the Ofﬁce of Civil Pro-
tection of REGAT;
– representative of the Directorate of Environment and
Spatial Planning of REGAT;
– representatives and members of the research teams of
HUA and NAGREF.
After Step 1 and 2 above, the following paragraphs indicate
how the “road map” was developed afterwards and present
the step-by-step process in the speciﬁc case of East Attica
region.
Step 3: After the establishment of the core Working
Group, four meetings were organized and attended by the
working group members. As mentioned above the basic is-
sue of the agenda of the four meetings was the “Elimination
of the Risk/Danger of Forest Fires in the Eastern Attica Re-
gion”.
The 1st meeting arrived at a partial consensus regarding
the speciﬁc goals to be pursued by the working group, all of
them conducive to the basic, above objective of the reduction
of forest ﬁre risk:
– 1st objective: reduction of the number of forest ﬁre
events owing to negligence and ignorance causes (pre-
disaster prevention phase);
– 2nd objective: early detection of ﬁre ignition points
(presuppression and preparedness phases);
– 3rd objective: intensiﬁcation of the search/detection of
the unknown causes of the phenomenon (prevention
phase);
– 4th objective: enhancement of prevention and prepared-
ness versus forest ﬁres and boosting participation of the
civil society in relevant processes as well as in reforesta-
tion (all phases of the disaster cycle including recovery-
rehabilitation).
Especially the 4th objective, regarding involvement of the
civil society in prevention, preparedness, and reforestation,
was considered highly relevant and signiﬁcant; however, this
prioritization necessitated enlargement of the working group
to include critical stakeholders with accessibility to the civil
society. Indeed, it was decided during the 1st meeting that
the working group should enlarge to incorporate Local Au-
thority representatives, volunteer ﬁremen or representatives
of NGOs. In essence this is about feedback from Step 3 to
Step 2 so as to change the initial Working Group.
Steps 4 and 5: during the 2nd meeting, a special commit-
tee within the wider working group was constituted in order
to accommodate the development of channels and processes
of communication (regarding forest ﬁre issues) among the
Civil Society and Local and Regional Government. These
channels were considered an essential precondition for the
information, awareness, and involvement of the lay public in
the management of forest ﬁre risk. The decision-making pro-
cess was based on the suggestions made by the research team
– acting as mediator – and which pivoted on the results and
agreements of previous meetings regarding goals and mea-
sures to be pursued.
Four measures were chosen for implementation by taking
into account not only the objectives established but also some
additional criteria such as social/political acceptance, admin-
istrative cost minimization, the limited time available, avail-
ability of human and other resources by Local Authorities
willing to be involved, etc. These criteria to ensure the feasi-
bility and applicability of the measures (see Step 5 in Fig. 3)
implied a repeatedly-occurring feedback loop from Step 5 to
4 and again back to 5.
It is worth mentioning that the agreed measures (not
only as a group but even individually) facilitate coordina-
tion/communication and synergies between Forest Policy,
Spatial Planning, and Civil Protection. In particular:
– Measure 1: awareness training of the Public on Forest
Fire Causes and Management Issues (Training seminars
addressed to pupils of 12–14yr of age). This is a Civil
Protection measure, contributing however to forest ﬁre
preventionbymeansofspatialplanningthroughtheem-
phasis given to the land-use conﬂicts behind the causes
of the phenomenon;
– Measure 2: enhancing Self-defence of Residences Ver-
sus Fires (in forest-residential areas) and Creation of a
Relevant Geo-data Basis (to support preventive spatial
planning in mixed forest residential areas). This is a
measure coupling Civil Protection and Spatial Planning;
– Measure 3: correction of Ambiguities, Contradictions,
Uncertainties regarding (unspeciﬁed) Competences at
the Regional and Local Level Affecting Forest Fire Risk
and Possibilities of Risk Mitigation (relevant to spa-
tial planning, civil protection and forest policy). This
is a measure articulating Sectoral Planning with Spatial
Planning and Civil Protection from the point of view of
public administration competences;
– Measure 4: coordination between the Local Authori-
ties and Forest Service as regards Forest Fuel Clearance
Works. This measure links Sectoral Planning Authori-
ties at different levels of the legal-administrative system
(vertical coordination).
Measure 4 failed in implementation; the other three have
been consistently implemented rendering impressive results.
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Figure 7: Houses and roads are classified as to the level of vulnerability of residence (T) 
(Source: Xanthopoulos et al. 2010) 
Regarding input of the involved partners to the 2nd measure this refers basically to (a) the 
volunteering groups recruited by Municipalities and accepting to be involved in the field survey, (b) 
the Municipality technical departments keeping and updating a geo-data basis concerning the Out-of-
Plan mixed forest residential areas and (c) the academic research staff specialized in forest fire issues 
and willing to offer advisory services relevant to exposure/vulnerability mitigation. The respective 
Monitoring Indicators and measuring values are indicated in Table 4. 
As concerns output of the applied 2nd measure the respective elements to be monitored are: (a) the 
number of filled registration cards (by volunteers surveyors), (b) the area of mixed forest-residential 
areas covered by thematic maps on fire risk and vulnerability levels of existing buildings within and 
(c) the population of contacted owners/tenants to be given information and advice regarding their 
vulnerable properties and risk mitigation necessities. The respective monitoring indicators and 
measuring values are also included in Table 4. Finally, the impact of the applied measure on targets 
and established objectives can be anticipated by indicators reflecting reduction of exposure and 
vulnerability levels at both scales of the individual building (micro) and wider territories (forest-
residential). 
Fig. 7. Houses and roads are classiﬁed as to the level of vulnerabil-
ity of residence (T) (Source: Xanthopoulos et al., 2010).
Steps 6 and 7: Implementation results and monitoring in-
dicators are presented below only for the case of measure 2
as an indicative and representative example. Implementation
of the 2nd measure necessitated ﬁrst a ﬁeld survey (in areas
identiﬁed and delineated with the help of Google Earth) on
the basis of a building registration card specifying criteria
and conditions of building exposure and vulnerability to for-
est ﬁres (see Fig. 7). It was decided that the survey should
and could be carried out by the volunteering groups (for for-
est ﬁres) of the Municipality.
Altogether 86 buildings were surveyed in relation to their
vulnerability and risk of destruction features and conditions.
Consequently, all registered buildings have been evaluated
quantitatively (by the NAGREF research team) regarding
their vulnerability and risk of destruction level and have been
included in a relevant thematic map (covering a hill which
is a mixed forest-residential area). As a ﬁnal step, the NA-
GREF team sent the ﬁnal scores of the surveyed buildings
with reference to their weak points back to the owners to get
their responses (via an additional questionnaire attached to
the document with the scores). The analysis and assessment
of the 86 building registration cards has been followed by
the production of thematic maps illustrating the vulnerabil-
ity index of streets and buildings (see Fig. 7), risk index in
relation to the characteristics of ﬁre, and a total risk index
regarding the potential of the destruction of buildings. These
maps constitute a valuable background for micro- and local
scale spatial planning interventions to mitigate risk levels.
The basic achievement of this measure is the involvement
of the Municipality and volunteer ﬁre ﬁghters in a form of
Spatial Planning targeted to the purpose of risk management
and familiarization of the public with the role and importance
of Spatial Planning in forest ﬁre prevention, (very important
for the interconnected territorial governance processes).
Regarding input of the involved partners to the 2nd mea-
sure, this refers basically to (a) the volunteering groups
recruited by Municipalities and accepting involvement in
the ﬁeld survey, (b) the Municipality technical departments
keepingandupdatingageo-databasisconcerningtheOut-of-
Plan mixed forest residential areas and (c) the academic re-
search staff specialized in forest ﬁre issues and willing to of-
fer advisory services relevant to exposure/vulnerability miti-
gation. The respective Monitoring Indicators and measuring
values are indicated in Table 4.
Asconcernsoutputoftheapplied2ndmeasure, therespec-
tive elements to be monitored are: (a) the number of ﬁlled
registration cards (by volunteers surveyors), (b) the area
of mixed forest-residential areas covered by thematic maps
on ﬁre risk and vulnerability levels of existing buildings
within and (c) the population of contacted owners/tenants
to be given information and advice regarding their vulnera-
ble properties and risk mitigation necessities. The respective
monitoringindicatorsandmeasuringvaluesarealsoincluded
in Table 4. Finally, the impact of the applied measure on tar-
gets and established objectives can be anticipated by indica-
tors reﬂecting reduction of exposure and vulnerability levels
at both scales of the individual building (micro) and wider
territories (forest-residential).
6.3 The case of Lazio Region facing forest ﬁres
The Italian case study was implemented considering the for-
est ﬁre risk involving the south of the Lazio Region, and in
particular the Province of Latina, which in the last years (be-
tween 2004 and 2009) suffered the highest proportion of for-
est ﬁres in the region. An overview on the distribution of
forest ﬁres in the Lazio Region in 2010 is offered by Fig. 8.
The main goal of the case study in the Lazio Region was
“reduction of forest ﬁre risk” by means of actions supporting
institutional cooperation between Civil Protection and Urban
Planning at regional level with an impact at local level (and
therefore two ofﬁces which are in charge of different parts
of the disaster management cycle presented in Fig. 1). Start-
ing from the awareness of a lack of horizontal coordination
between the responsible authorities in terms of risk preven-
tion, in Step 1 of the application of the concept of agreement
on objectives the Civil Protection Department of the Lazio
Region (PCRL) underlined the need of a more intense col-
laboration with other departments of the region (as e.g. spa-
tial planning) in order to mitigate the risk. Moreover, the
case study highlighted the need of balancing improvements
for a rapid and effective suppression mechanism on the one
hand and the need for an appropriate pre-disaster preventive
spatial planning on the other. The importance of building
a broad consensus obtained by means of a participatory ap-
proach and negotiation of the demands for building and new
development plans was acknowledged.
As Step 2, the working group was set-up involving the
Lazio Region Department of Civil Protection, the Lazio Re-
gion Department of Territorial Planning, the National Re-
search Council – Institute of Research on Population and So-
cial Policies (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche – Istituto
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Table 4. Monitoring indicators for Measure 2 (Creation of a geo-data basis for the mixed, forest- residential, Out of – Plan areas of East
Attica) (Source: Sapountzaki et al., 2011).
The steps/to be controlled The element to be monitored Monitoring Indicators (and Measuring
values)
The input of the involved part-
ners (the Region of East At-
tica, the respective Municipali-
ties, the Research Institutions)
The volunteers ﬁre-ﬁghters of
the Municipality/Region em-
ployed in the survey
Proportion of the population of volun-
teers participating in the building sur-
vey
Man-hours of volunteers dedicated to
the building survey in mixed forest-
residential areas (on a yearly basis)
The data basis of the Municipal-
ity/Region regarding Out-of Plan,
forest-residential areas
Availability(perMunicipality)ofageo-
data basis (YES/NO) and of specialized
personnel to manage its constant updat-
ing (YES/NO)
Academic- Research staff specialized
on forest ﬁre issues and available for
consultative/ advisory services
Man-hours of researchers /consultants
devoted to vulnerability estimation, sta-
tistical analyses and advice on mitiga-
tion actions
Theeffectivenessandefﬁciency
of the survey, assessment and
mapping of Out-of-Plan build-
ings with regard to their vulner-
ability and risk of destruction
levels versus forest ﬁres
The ﬁlled in questionnaires/forms
regarding building vulnerability
and ﬁre risk level
Numbers of ﬁlled in questionnaires per
time unit
Numbers of ﬁlled in questionnaires per
man-hour of volunteers
The thematic maps on ﬁre risk and
vulnerability levels of mixed forest-
residential areas
Area covered by thematic, maps on
buildings’ vulnerability and risk level
per year and per Municipality
The informed owners/tenants Numbers of informed building own-
ers/tenants per year and per Municipal-
ity
The impact of the building survey and
Vulnerability/Risk Mapping on the pos-
sibility of reducing forest ﬁre risk in the
Region of East Attica
Exposure and vulnerability condi-
tions/levels of the mapped mixed
forest-residential areas
Degree of reduction of exposure and
vulnerability levels of buildings in the
mapped mixed areas per biennium per
Municipality
di Ricerche sulla Popolazione e le Politiche Sociali), the
National Association of Italian Municipalities – Lazio (As-
sociazione Nazionale dei Comuni Italiani - Lazio) and T6
EcosystemsSrl. TheINCAworkinggroupdeﬁnedthereduc-
tion of forest ﬁre risk through an institutional cooperation be-
tween Civil Protection and Urban Planning on regional level
with an impact on local level as objective for the process
(Step 3), as there is a lack of horizontal coordination between
the responsible authorities in terms of risk prevention, which
meansfragmentation, amongothers, betweencivilprotection
and spatial planning.
During a number of meetings, the following mitigation
measures were identiﬁed in order to reach the previously de-
ﬁned objective (Step 4):
– identiﬁcation of vulnerable areas by integrating data
from Civil Protection and Urban Plans (it was imple-
mented in the Municipalities of Sermoneta and Fondi);
– increase of the forest-ﬁre risk awareness among pro-
fessional associations (e.g. of architects, urban planners
and engineers) by a questionnaire;
– revision and improvement of regional law L.R. 22 De-
cember 1999, n. 38 on territorial government (Norme
sul governo del territorio);
– guidelines for local administrations on the coordination
of civil protection and territorial plans in order to iden-
tify and preserve vulnerable areas prone to forest ﬁres
(usable beyond the case study);
– planning and implementation of training for technical
staff of public administration on coordinated planning
methodology.
Activities for the implementation of the measures as a test
of feasibility (Step 5) were focused only on the 1st and 2nd
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Figure 8: Location of the Lazio Region in Italy (left figure; Source Eurostat, 2007) and Forest 
fires in the Lazio Region in 2010 (right figure; Source: Corpo Forestale dello Stato, 
2010). 
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Civil Protection and Urban Planning on regional level with an impact on local level as objective for 
the process (Step 3), as there is a lack of horizontal coordination between the responsible authorities 
in terms of risk prevention, which means fragmentation, among others, between civil protection and 
spatial planning. 
During a number of meetings, the following mitigation measures were identified in order to reach the 
previously defined objective (Step 4): 
•  Identification of vulnerable areas by integrating data from Civil Protection and Urban Plans (it 
was implemented in the Municipalities of Sermoneta and Fondi); 
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Activities for the implementation of the measures as a test of feasibility (Step 5) were focused only 
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nd measure during the INCA project activities and the 3
rd was discussed and prepared. 
The 4
th and the 5
th measure, however relevant, require a special and continuous support to be 
implemented. In consequence activities for Measures 1 to 3 are presented in the following. 
Fig. 8. Location of the Lazio Region in Italy (left; Source Eurostat, 2007) and Forest ﬁres in the Lazio Region in 2010 (right; Source: Corpo
Forestale dello Stato, 2010).
measure during the INCA project activities and the 3rd was
discussed and prepared. The 4th and the 5th measures, how-
ever relevant, require special and continuous support to be
implemented. In consequence, activities for Measures 1 to 3
are presented in the following.
Measure 1: Identiﬁcation of vulnerable areas by integrat-
ing data from Civil Protection and Urban Plans
The aim of the 1st measure “Identiﬁcation of vulnerable
areas by integrating data from Civil Protection and Urban
Plans” was to analyse the interface ﬁre risk maps of the
civil protection and intersect them with the territorial, urban,
and landscape plan in order to identify critical structures and
buildings that could be hit by such a phenomena to assign
them a higher alert level. The related indicator was “Number
of newly identiﬁed vulnerable areas” (see Table 2).
The experts in Civil Protection and in the Urban and Spa-
tial Planning Department selected a range of maps and in-
formation that could be crossed and analysed to give new
perspectives to the analysis of ﬁre risk and ﬁre exposure (e.g.
the CTR (Regional Technical Map), PTPR (Piano Territori-
ale Paesistico Regionale), the Spatial Plan of Lazio Region,
aerial photos; road system; vegetation and geology map;
public and strategic services exposed to ﬁre risk, etc.). The
resultwastheidentiﬁcationofareasvulnerabletoforestﬁres.
Measure 2: Increase awareness among professional asso-
ciations
The formed working group decided that awareness of
forest ﬁre risk among professionals (e.g. architects, urban
planners, construction engineers) is an important factor for
prevention, as they are directly involved in planning pro-
cesses and constructions, implementing technical work for
municipalities. It was assumed that higher awareness would
lead to an integration of forest ﬁre risks in plans from the
very beginning. A questionnaire was developed and dis-
tributed among the professional associations of the ﬁeld in
the province of Latina in order to achieve information on
the three main critical aspects which emerged in the work-
ing group: development, control of the territory, and ﬁre risk
prevention. The related indicator was “Number of Number
of ﬁlled-in questionnaires” (see Table 2).
One result was the lack of information on the analysed
subjects even when they represent, as it is for Fire Registry,
binding elements to territorial alterations. Other outcomes
were that the Civil Protection Plan should be a local planning
instrument covering various risks and showing models of in-
tervention as well as legally-binding constraints, conﬁrming
the need of intersecting decision making process involving
different competencies concurring in deﬁning the different
plans and decision-making tools for risk governance.
Measure 3: Revision and improvement of regional law
L.R. 22 December 1999, n. 38 on territorial government
The Law of the Lazio Region “LR 38/99” regulates ter-
ritorial government. It is aimed at the protection, arrange-
ment, transformation and use of a territory and its attaining
buildings. The working group decided to propose to the re-
gional government an adaptation of Art. 37 of the Regional
Law 38/99 with the aim to add a study on forest ﬁre risk
for setting-up new territorial plans in order to mitigate forest
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ﬁre risk. This process continues after the end of the INCA
project.
After the deﬁnition of the measures and some ﬁrst results
of their implementation, the working group agreed on indi-
cators and measuring values for each measure and attributed
an evaluation for the situation at the end of the case study
(Step 6). As an example, the indicator and measuring values
for Measure 1 (Identiﬁcation of vulnerable areas by integrat-
ing data from Civil Protection and Urban Plans) are:
Indicator: Number of local analysis on vulnerable areas
by integrating civil protection and territorial plans
Classiﬁcation:
– Red – No local analysis implemented.
– Orange – Local analysis implemented in a case
study area.
– Yellow – 50% of local communities in the Lazio
Region analysed.
– Green – 75% of local communities in the Lazio Re-
gion analysed.
– Blue – All local communities in the Lazio Region
analysed.
Current state of the art:
– Orange – Local analysis implemented in a case
study area
Stakeholder involvement and information (Step 7) is of ma-
jor importance in order to guarantee acceptance of the mea-
sures taken in Step 4 and their implementation in Step 5. As
resources were limited, the working group decided only on
two activities which are, however, of high importance for the
integration of the results and the dissemination of the mea-
sures:
– The municipality of Sermoneta was actively involved in
the ﬁrst measure and contributed comprehensively to its
successful implementation. Various meetings were or-
ganised with the mayor and the technical representative
for planning and civil protection. In addition, profes-
sionals who are in charge of territorial plans as well as
volunteers (civil protection) were involved in the dis-
cussions and presentations. In order to give the work
of Sermoneta some visibility, an excursion was made in
the framework of the INCA ﬁnal conference;
– A report was produced in Italian, focusing on the in-
tegration of civil protection and territorial plans for
the identiﬁcation of vulnerable areas and infrastructure.
This report serves two targets: it is the basis for the
suggestion of the adaptation of the regional law (mea-
sure 3), describing the background for such a sugges-
tion. On the other hand it was distributed to all munici-
palitiesintheLazioRegion, providingstrongarguments
for its transfer.
It is important to mention that measures, indicators, and
measuring values usually change over time with changes in
thepolitical, social, andeconomicalcontext. Thisimpliesthe
need of continuous monitoring and review of risk governance
process as well as continuous consultation (Step 8).
Support for continuous monitoring is provided by a soft-
ware tool that has been developed within the INCA project.
In fact, an output control software tool for monitoring and
controlling the implementation process was set-up; it allows
thedeﬁnitionofstructuralandnon-structuralmitigationmea-
sures, the possible outcome, suitable monitoring indicators,
and criteria for the quality of chosen measures in order to
ensure an output-control.
7 Discussion
The newly perceived, designed, and implemented concept of
risk mitigation is intended to constitute a signiﬁcant advance
in the ﬁeld of risk management, especially in prevention, sat-
isfying at the same time the principles of risk governance.
As described before, the proposed method has been ap-
plied in two hazard cases and three territorial/administrative
contexts: (a) the city of Dortmund facing ﬂash ﬂoods, (b) the
East Attica region facing forest ﬁres and (c) the Lazio Re-
gion also facing forest ﬁres. It is obvious that these three
empirical processes, the respective achieved results, the ob-
stacles encountered, and successes and failures experienced
constitute valuable information for a documented review of
the model and its wider validity. Evaluation however, neces-
sitates points of departure or of reference in relation to which
it would be possible to address progress or regression owing
to the new model. Furthermore, evaluation necessitates cri-
teria on the basis of which progress could be addressed.
Regarding the point or state of reference, the current situa-
tion (with the rigid, separate policies, plans and programmes
of civil protection, sectoral risk mitigation, and spatial plan-
ning) constitutes the starting point. Regarding criteria of
evaluation, the anticipated virtues and pursued advantages
constitute the means of criticism and review. Further criteria
for evaluation are: (a) the administrative cost entailed, (b) the
motivationaleffectofthemodelonhouseholdsandeconomic
actors to take self-protection measures and to avoid risk-
increasing ventures and (c) the political and social accept-
ability of the model (regarding liberty, fairness, environmen-
tal justice, etc). It is obvious that the efﬁciency and effective-
ness of the model in relation to the ultimate objective of risk
reduction can be evaluated only in the long run. Currently,
effectiveness and efﬁciency should be judged with respect
to intermediate sub-objectives only, i.e. successful pilot im-
plementation of the agreed measures by the working groups.
Whether this pilot implementation will constitute a leading
example, whether it will be repeated in the future and be-
come an embedded administrative routine procedure at the
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regional and local level and whether this process will lead up
to radical risk mitigation is a matter of future studies.
In the following paragraphs, the method is judged in con-
nection to a few results selected from the above criteria, in
the light of the three case studies.
7.1 The criterion of continuity in the Response –
Preparedness – Prevention – Remediation (RPPR)
chain
Interconnection of measures targeting the different phases of
the disaster cycle has been achieved in all three implemen-
tation cases. The envisaged continuity between the succes-
sive stages of risk management has been achieved in various
ways:
– byknowledgeableworkinggroupsaddressingthewhole
spectrum of management stages in the commonly
agreed sub-objectives and measures and by assigning
their implementation to their best collaborating mem-
bers;
– by working groups providing for the mutual support and
synergies among the above, commonly accepted sub-
objectives and measures;
– by working groups inventing measures which are in-
herently integral (in terms of the various management
stages), meaning that they address and secure on their
own coherence between the successive management
stages;
– by working groups engaging in prevention matters, civil
protection bodies, and agencies which traditionally are
assigned only roles which are relevant to emergency re-
sponse.
By its constitution, the working group, as long as it in-
cludes representatives of the various management stages and
domains, brings the traditionally separate domains of rele-
vant policy-making closer. To the extent that the working
groups can promote itself as a new political/administrative
unit gaining always more power of policy-making, the situ-
ation regarding sequential association of management stages
will always improve.
7.2 The criterion of bridging gaps and correcting
inconsistencies between civil protection, spatial
planning and sectoral measures in risk management
These gaps and inconsistencies in risk management may re-
sult in serious management problems. An indicative example
is ﬁre suppression operations organized without knowledge
of existing water sources such as water tanks, which are pos-
sibly located in a territory at risk.
Such problems can be tackled in a number of ways:
– by inserting appropriate spatial information into civil
protection and preparedness planning and reversely by
updating and enriching spatial planning with civil pro-
tection information;
– by including risk mitigation goals in the agenda of spa-
tial planning objectives;
– by familiarizing spatial planning authorities with risk,
vulnerability, exposure, and risk mitigation issues and
reversely by convincing the masterminds of emergency
planning about the importance of spatial dimensions for
the success of emergency and risk management in gen-
eral.
The proposed approach has indeed the potential to employ
a large variety of ways to coordinate several policy ﬁelds that
are co-responsible in risk management. At ﬁrst co-existence
of spatial planners, civil protection experts and risk managers
in the same working group facilitates an exchange of infor-
mation among the differently-oriented participants and learn-
ing from each other in a sustainable way. The learning effect
inﬂuences further work and leads to a new culture of col-
laboration. Secondly, the commitment of all participants to
contribute to the implementation of co-decided measures im-
plies that the commonly agreed measures have in most cases
a multidisciplinary dimension necessitating input from all in-
volved ﬁelds. An indicative example is the case of the mea-
sure of “Training seminars on forest ﬁre issues addressed to
pupils” adopted by the Greek working group. These sem-
inars were structured in two sessions where the ﬁrst cov-
ered the spatial planning dimensions of the catastrophic phe-
nomenon while the second focused on the foresters’ and for-
est ﬁre managers’ point of view.
Obviously this interweaving of spatial planning with civil
protection and risk prevention that enhances the instruments
available by risk mitigation, the spatial data base ,and the-
matic maps on “spatial distribution of ﬂood-controlling in-
frastructure in relation to ﬂood exposed areas”, is one good
example of such innovative tools. Another example is the-
matic maps on the “risk of destruction” and “vulnerability
level of buildings” in mixed forest-residential territories and
other map cases depicting “exposure-scapes”.
7.3 The criterion of coupling structural and
non-structural measures to achieve risk mitigation
It is widely acknowledged that risk mitigation suffers from
unilateral reliance of the responsible administrations on
structural or engineering hazard modiﬁcation measures.
The proposed model is indeed an ideal method for the
formulation of risk management solutions representing mix-
tures of measures which balance the engineers’, social scien-
tists’, physical geographers’ and managers’ points of view.
Most part of the added value out of the implementation of
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the concept in the three European regions is related to plan-
ning and realization of non-structural measures which might
function as an adhesive tissue, binding together engineering
infrastructure work with preparedness measures, etc. Elo-
quent examples of such integrated measures taken from the
three Case Studies are:
– the creation of a spatial data base and thematic maps
on risk and vulnerability levels of buildings in a mixed
forest-residential area of the East Attica region. The
maps address in combination the ﬂammability of build-
ing construction materials, distance of forest fuels from
the buildings, and accessibility standards of the emer-
gency road network. These maps constitute guiding in-
formation platforms for comprehensive, mixed mitiga-
tion actions and interventions;
– the creation of a thematic map of Dortmund present-
ing pumping locations from past ﬂood events in relation
to locations of ﬂood control critical facilities. These
maps are again information platforms for the enforce-
ment of packages of structural, training, and organiza-
tional measures of either public or private initiative;
– the creation of a map identifying the vulnerable areas
(prone to forest ﬁre) by integrating data from civil pro-
tection and urban plans, in the case of the Lazio Region.
This is an important planning tool for the municipalities
to guide future development activities and it is envis-
aged as a tool for adaptation/review of the regional law
on territorial government;
The model offers the opportunity of balanced risk mitiga-
tion, meaning the employment of both structural and non-
structural measures. The only but crucial pre-condition is
equal and active representation in the working group of those
responsible for non-structural measures.
7.4 The criterion of effectiveness and efﬁciency of the
model and its sustainability
Effectiveness refers to the realization of the consensually de-
cided objectives (by the working group): how fast are these
attained and with how much certainty? Besides, will it be
possible for the approach to adapt to changing situations?
Efﬁciency on the other hand is about the achievements com-
pared to the input used, (i.e. economic costs but also social,
political, psychological, environmental, etc).
The basic advantage of the model with respect to effective-
ness is that it is an output-oriented process. This means that it
is a management process designed to ﬁt to the risk problem
as it is manifested in the speciﬁc territory under considera-
tion. This situation is very different from the conventional
model where the risk management process is adjusted to the
legal-administrative system which puts it into practice (input
oriented model). The model’s option is indeed revolutionary
and opens wide horizons regarding the future mode of oper-
ation of public administrations, not only in the ﬁeld of risk
management but also in other policy ﬁelds.
At ﬁrst glance, this adaptation of the responsible struc-
ture administering a risk problem to the problem’s features
and to optimal, mixed-policy solutions looks like a guar-
antee of effectiveness. However, obstacles may arise this
time from the legal-administrative system, which may resist
change in decision-making hierarchies, deny loss of polit-
ical/administrative power, attempt to cancel any unfamiliar
process and reject intruding external agencies. This is ex-
actly what happened in the Greek and Italian implementa-
tion cases at the regional (in Greece) and provincial level (in
Italy), respectively. The authorities were unwilling to par-
ticipate in working groups initiated by an external initiative,
i.e. coming from non-formal administrative actors and proce-
dures. Thus, the implementation took place at the municipal
levelwhichismoreopenandﬂexibleinadministrativenorms
and procedures. However, it is obvious that the effectiveness
of the model may be in jeopardy owing to the resistance to
change (of the existing balance of power) on the part of the
established political/administrative interests.
Nevertheless, the model provides for feedback that can oc-
cur at any step of the road map procedure so as to increase
its chances of effectiveness. That is exactly how the working
group synthesis and spatial range of objectives and measures
canchangeincasefrictionsemergeamongparticipantsofthe
initial working group or if authorities (at the regional level)
show unwillingness to participate. In any case and even if
feedback provides an outlet, it entails considerable delays in
the process of implementation reducing the effectiveness of
the whole venture.
Regarding efﬁciency: it is guaranteed but only when the
whole implementation process proves to be effective, i.e.
all steps are implemented. Efﬁciency is facilitated by the
participation of all involved authorities and stakeholders in
decision-making (on mitigation measures and their applica-
tion too), which entails aggregation of the whole range of
available resources (public and private) and their employ-
ment for the common purpose. Under such circumstances,
opportunities arise to use these resources with a common
spirit of resource-saving by means of economies of scale,
creation of synergies, etc. Hence, efﬁciency of the concept
of agreement on objectives can be very high but depends on
its effectiveness.
Finally, sustainability of the process within or alongside
existing regional or municipal administrative procedures is
indeed a tricky question. If the new model will not be em-
bedded in the formal system, then the traditional pattern of
policy-making will run in parallel and most probably will
come in conﬂict with it. However, embedding the concept
of agreement on objectives in the existing system presup-
poses political acceptance, restructuring of the administra-
tion pyramids, and radical changes in the culture of the pub-
lic ofﬁcials. It is evident that these changes are difﬁcult and
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slow processes; besides such changes presuppose convinc-
ing, almost impressive results from pilot voluntary imple-
mentations of the concept of agreement on objectives. Only
then imitators will appear and act as propagators and dissem-
inators of the new process.
8 Conclusions
The concept of agreement on objectives is potentially able
to lower the given disaster risk by bringing the actors in-
volved throughout the disaster cycle together and improving
the inter-organisational coordination. Moreover, the agree-
ment on common objectives aims at a reduction of risk by
a choice of effective, efﬁcient and ﬂexible measures whose
impact is monitored through a continuous process.
This implies a shift from a top-down to a more collabo-
rative form of decision-making, which means a shift from
functional rationality to communicative rationality (De Roo,
2003). Inthiscontext, it is obviousthatthefocusontheprob-
lem itself shifts to its deﬁnition and the degree of consen-
sus on that deﬁnition. Thus, decision-making is also about
whom to involve in the decision-making process. Here, com-
municative rationality has to be seen as an essential part of
decision-making. The concept of agreement on common ob-
jectives and the related road map have to be understood as a
practical exercise in communicative rationality.
However, a problem of communicative rationality is re-
lated to the probably questionable or limited tolerance of
the wider political context, i.e. the political-administrative
system. Regions and other sub-national administrative en-
tities in different countries enjoy different levels of indepen-
dence in making their own risk mitigation policies. There-
fore, sometimes lack of coordination at the regional level is
basically explained by the dependence of sectoral policies
at this level on decision-making at higher levels (national
and even supra-national), i.e. the top-down model of policy-
making. Therefore the proposed alternative strategy has to
be ﬂexible so as to be applicable at different spatial levels (in
each case in conformity with the legal-administrative con-
text of the speciﬁc member state). In cases of centralized
political-administrative systems where the pattern of top-
down policy-making and implementation predominates, the
lower regional and local levels are bound by the upper ones
to implement the policies of the latter and enjoy limited dis-
cretiontoformulatetheirownandfollowownpathstospatial
planning and risk mitigation.
The presented road map has been considered as useful for
overcoming the above obstacles and facilitating the process
of “Agreement on Objectives”. Nonetheless, the most im-
portant prerequisite for its applicability remains the willing-
ness of the involved actors to reach an agreement on common
objectives and actions to achieve them. However, the three
test cases have underlined that such willingness exists even
in different legal-administrative and cultural environments
and must not be a contradiction to the genuine interests of
organisations. Moreover, it was demonstrated that output-
oriented management approaches that have been widely used
for decades, i.e. in new public management, can be trans-
ferred to the management of natural hazards.
Edited by: T. Glade
Reviewed by: P. Schmidt-Thom´ e and two other anonymous referees
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